Eros i

“Det er Eros, som har Æren for al Skaben og nydannelse i Verden.
Det er ganske simpelt Platons og Hellenernes Eros.”

– Sophus Claussen; Notater s. 106

“Eros er ikke et udelukkende positivt begreb; der findes ‘smuk’ og ‘forkastelig’ eros, og det var den almindelige opfattelse, at det er både vulgært og forkasteligt, hvis eros kun består af ren og skær tilfredsstillelse af et fysisk behov. Det er et udtryk for den enkeltes gode eller dårlige karakter, om et erotisk forhold er smuk eller forkasteligt; der er ikke nogen moralsk skelnen imellem eros mellem de to køn og eros mellem to af samme køn.”

– R. Sevelsted & C. G. Tortzen i forordet til Platons Symposion.

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Sophus Claussen: Notater og Skitser, København 1993
Platon: Samlede værker i ny oversættelse, bind II. København 2010. s. 307))

Om selverkendelse (1)

Indholdet af følgende citat fra et essay af Morten Albæk i Berlingske for et par år siden er i enhver henseende sandt og noget ethvert menneske burde tage til sig og ideelt burde kunne tage til sig.

“Gnothi seauton! Kend dig selv! Denne opfordring fra den græske filosof Thales fra ca. år 600 f.Kr. skulle ifølge overleveringen være indhugget i portalen til templet for visdommens og lysets gud Apollon i Delfi. Et par århundreder eller tre senere fulgte Sokrates trop og insisterede på, at mennesket må kende sig selv for at kunne forstå sin omverden. Og siden har snart sagt enhver af historiens største tænkere lige fra Platon over Cicero og Montaigne til Kant og vores egen Kierkegaard med hver deres accenter forfægtet det fundamentalt nødvendige i, at man som menneske erkender sig selv så tæt så fuldkomment som overhovedet muligt, før man kan være kyndig på noget som helst andet. Så i mere end 2.500 år er vi igen og igen blevet opfordret til at udvikle vores evne til at kende os selv; udvikle vores selverkendelse. Arbejde med vores indsigt i egen formåen gennem en indsigt i egne begrænsninger – moralske, etiske, fysiske og intellektuelle.

Og det er svært at påstå, at der er noget, der er vigtigere for et menneske at være i besiddelse af end en sund selverkendelse. I hvert fald hvis man på egne eller andre menneskers vegne har ambitioner om at leve et godt og meningsfyldt liv. For uden selverkendelse er det per definition umuligt vide, hvem du er og mindst lige så vigtigt, hvem du ikke er. Og hvis du ikke ved nogen af delene, er det svært at vide, hvordan du skal møde andre mennesker. Du vil derfor uden at kende dig selv med sikkerhed fare vild ikke bare i dit eget, men også i andres. Med andre ord: Jo sundere din selverkendelse er, jo mere ved du om, hvad du kan, og hvad du ikke kan. Hvem du kan blive, og hvem du ikke kan blive. Hvem du vil være, og hvem du ikke ønsker nogensinde at blive. Dine muligheder og begrænsninger. Dine kompetencer og inkompetencer. Dine styrker og svagheder. Dine charmerende såvel som dine ucharmerende sider. Og jo mere du ved om dig selv, jo mere kan du også møde de forpligtelser, der følger af at være et medmenneske – et menneske der deler et fællesskab med andre mennesker.” ()

Problemet er bare, at Morten Albæk i sit essay bruger dette som afsæt for at skyde på danskernes kollektive selvopfattelse. Men den form for introspektion som er beskrevet ovenfor, er rent personlig og har intet at gøre med dette – sikkert ganske berettigede – overfald på danskerne:

“Ikke desto mindre synes det vestlige menneskes selverkendelsesniveau at være på et historisk lavpunkt. Vi synes at have spundet os ind i en eksistentiel tornerosesøvn, der har beriget os med en oppumpet selvtillid og selvtilstrækkelighed, der hviler på et falsk selvbillede af egne evner, færdigheder og kvaliteter.

I min levetid (født 1975) har jeg været øjenvidne til og deltager i et bevidstløst spektakel, hvor danskerne med stadig større selvtilfredshed har fejret sig selv som et samfund (det danske) i en kultursfære (den vestlige), hvor man er særligt produktiv, voldsomt effektiv, guddommeligt innovativ, yderst sofistikeret, grænseløst kreativ, umådeligt frit tænkende og ekstraordinært oplyst og veluddannet – og det sammenlignet med ethvert andet folkeslag i enhver anden kultursfære.” ()

I sidste ende har det intet som helst at gøre med din personlige udvikling, din selverkendelse eller dit liv, hvad alle de andre gør, undtagen – desværre – som et eksempel på hvad du ikke skal gøre. Du kan fint hvile i dig selv, uanset om 99% af resten af befolkningen gør det eller ej, og selvom du kan lære noget ved at betragte dine omgivelser og de bizarre ting der foregår der:

Hvis der går et spøgelse gennem Europa (eller verden) i dag, må det være den hvide illusion om frihed: at vi er frie, selvstyrede individer, der i alle henseender – pga. alle de frie valg, markedet og frisættelsen  forkæler os med – kan sætte vores hat, som vi vil. Når man har vandret ned af en villavej med hyggelige forhaver og i næsten hver eneste spottet en Weber-grill, så har man et bizart billede på den højt besungne frihed – sjovt at vi alle træder i unik, personlig karakter og netop skal have en Weber-grill. Eller læse Da Vinci Mysteriet, spise sushi og drikke caffe latte. (Peter Thielst: At realisere sig selv. Frederiksberg 2005)

… så må du også erkende, at der er stor forskel på det at vide hvad man ikke skal gøre og på at vide hvad pokker man så skal gøre i stedet. Du har nok en fornemmelse af at selvom du skrotter Weber-grillen og afholder dig fra sushi og latte, så er du ikke kommet så meget videre endda. Hvad så?

Selv med Albæks ganske udførlige liste i hånden eller alverdens håndbøger i reolen, kommer man ikke i mål, om man fra allerførste skridt bevæger sig i den forkerte retning og man kunne instinktivt fristes til at tilføje et “Do not try this at home folks!” På den anden side kunne det også tænkes, at det undertiden var sådan, at selv det at fare en smule vild mens man går på opdagelse i sig selv, er bedre end blot at forblive hvor man er …

Dog er der en ting, som disse velmenende intellektuelle ofte enten overser, eller i hvertfald sjældent omtaler, og det er at man desværre må formode (læs: frygte!), at det er de færreste mennesker, der har de evner, den vilje og den intelligens der skal til, for at foretage en sådan indre rejse på egen hånd eller måske at kunne foretage den overhovedet. Risikoen for at fare vild i selvbedrag, rådvildhed eller ren og skær frustration er tilstede, for hver eneste skridt man tager. Livet er ikke demokratisk og nogle er bare bedre stillede end andre eller også er de så heldige at have en guide.

fortsættes …

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Morten Albæk: I mangel af selverkendelse. Berlingske, d. 24/4 2010)
Peter Thielst: At realisere sig selv. Frederiksberg 2005

 

Den største Lykke

“… jeg siger jer, at det er den største Lykke for et Menneske at diskutere hver eneste Dag om, hvorledes man kan blive et godt Menneske, og lignende Ting, som I har hørt mig tale om, naar jeg har prøvet mig selv og andre, og at et Liv uden saadan stadig Prøven ikke er menneskeværdigt.”

– Sokrates’ Forsvarstale
(Platons Skrifter bd. 1, Kbh. 1932. s. 294)

Eros

I en gymnastiksal i Athen for knap 2500 år siden:

Yesterday evening I returned from the army at Potidaea, and having been a good while away, I thought that I should like to go and look at my old haunts. So I went into the palaestra of Taureas, which is over against the temple adjoining the porch of the King Archon, and there I found a number of persons, most of whom I knew, but not all. My visit was unexpected, and no sooner did they see me entering than they saluted me from afar on all sides; and Chaerephon, who is a kind of madman, started up and ran to me, seizing my hand, and saying, How did you escape, Socrates?—(I should explain that an engagement had taken place at Potidaea not long before we came away, of which the news had only just reached Athens.)

– You see, I replied, that here I am.

– There was a report, he said, that the engagement was very severe, and that many of our acquaintance had fallen.

– That, I replied, was not far from the truth.

– I suppose, he said, that you were present.

– I was.

– Then sit down, and tell us the whole story, which as yet we have only heard imperfectly.

I took the place which he assigned to me, by the side of Critias the son of Callaeschrus, and when I had saluted him and the rest of the company, I told them the news from the army, and answered their several enquiries.

He proceeds to make enquiries about the state of philosophy and about the youth; and is told of the beautiful Charmides,

Then, when there had been enough of this, I, in my turn, began to make enquiries about matters at home—about the present state of philosophy, and about the youth. I asked whether any of them were remarkable for wisdom or beauty, or both. Critias, glancing at the door, invited my attention to some youths who were coming in, and talking noisily to one another, followed by a crowd. Of the beauties, Socrates, he said, I fancy that you will soon be able to form a judgment. For those who are just entering are the advanced guard of the great beauty, as he is thought to be, of the day, and he is likely to be not far off himself.

– Who is he, I said; and who is his father?

– Charmides, he replied, is his name; he is my cousin, and the son of my uncle Glaucon: I rather think that you know him too, although he was not grown up at the time of your departure.

– Certainly, I know him, I said, for he was remarkable even then when he was still a child, and I should imagine that by this time he must be almost a young man.

– You will see, he said, in a moment what progress he has made and what he is like. He had scarcely said the word, when Charmides entered.

– Now you know, my friend, that I cannot measure anything, and of the beautiful, I am simply such a measure as a white line is of chalk; for almost all young persons appear to be beautiful in my eyes. But at that moment, when I saw him coming in, I confess that I was quite astonished at his beauty and stature; all the world seemed to be enamoured of him; amazement and confusion reigned when he entered; and a troop of lovers followed him. That grown–up men like ourselves should have been affected in this way was not surprising, but I observed that there was the same feeling among the boys; all of them, down to the very least child, turned and looked at him, as if he had been a statue.

Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates? Has he not a beautiful face?

– Most beautiful, I said.

– But you would think nothing of his face, he replied, if you could see his naked form: he is absolutely perfect.

And to this they all agreed.

– By Heracles, I said, there never was such a paragon, if he has only one other slight addition.

– What is that? said Critias.

– If he has a noble soul…

(Char. 153a-154e. Overs: Jowett)

… og efter at have konstateret at skønheden (også) kommer indefra, beslutter Sokrates sig for at lege doktor med de unge drenge:

– Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul, naked and undisguised? he is just of an age at which he will like to talk.

– That he will, said Critias, and I can tell you that he is a philosopher already, and also a considerable poet, not in his own opinion only, but in that of others.

– That, my dear Critias, I replied, is a distinction which has long been in your family, and is inherited by you from Solon. But why do you not call him, and show him to us? for even if he were younger than he is, there could be no impropriety in his talking to us in the presence of you, who are his guardian and cousin.

– Very well, he said; then I will call him; and turning to the attendant, he said, Call Charmides, and tell him that I want him to come and see a physician about the illness of which he spoke to me the day before yesterday. Then again addressing me, he added: He has been complaining lately of having a headache when he rises in the morning: now why should you not make him believe that you know a cure for the headache?

– Why not, I said; but will he come?

– He will be sure to come, he replied.

(Char. 154e-b Overs: Jowett)

… og får sig et glimt af skønheden:

He [Charmides] came as he was bidden, and sat down between Critias and me. Great amusement was occasioned by every one pushing with might and main at his neighbour in order to make a place for him next to themselves, until at the two ends of the row one had to get up and the other was rolled over sideways. Now I, my friend, was beginning to feel awkward; my former bold belief in my powers of conversing with him had vanished. And when Critias told him that I was the person who had the cure, he looked at me in such an indescribable manner, and was just going to ask a question. And at that moment all the people in the palaestra crowded about us, and, O rare! I caught a sight of the inwards of his garment, and took the flame. Then I could no longer contain myself. I thought how well Cydias understood the nature of love, when, in speaking of a fair youth, he warns some one ‘not to bring the fawn in the sight of the lion to be devoured by him,’ for I felt that I had been overcome by a sort of wild–beast appetite.

(Char. 155c-e Overs: Jowett)

I Symposion er det den unge smukke Alkibiades som Sokrates har rettet sin interesse mod, men det er den unge mand, som bliver skuffet:

When the lamp was put out and the servants had gone away, I thought that I must be plain with him and have no more ambiguity. So I gave him a shake, and I said:

‘Socrates, are you asleep?’

‘No,’ he said.

‘Do you know what I am meditating?’

‘What are you meditating?’ he said.

‘I think,’ I replied, ‘that of all the lovers whom I have ever had you are the only one who is worthy of me, and you appear to be too modest to speak. Now I feel that I should be a fool to refuse you this or any other favour, and therefore I come to lay at your feet all that I have and all that my friends have, in the hope that you will assist me in the way of virtue, which I desire above all things, and in which I believe that you can help me better than any one else. And I should certainly have more reason to be ashamed of what wise men would say if I were to refuse a favour to such as you, than of what the world, who are mostly fools, would say of me if I granted it.’

To these words he replied in the ironical manner which is so characteristic of him:

‘Alcibiades, my friend, you have indeed an elevated aim if what you say is true, and if there really is in me any power by which you may become better; truly you must see in me some rare beauty of a kind infinitely higher than any which I see in you. And therefore, if you mean to share with me and to exchange beauty for beauty, you will have greatly the advantage of me; you will gain true beauty in return for appearance—like Diomede, gold in exchange for brass. But look again, sweet friend, and see whether you are not deceived in me. The mind begins to grow critical when the bodily eye fails, and it will be a long time before you get old.’

Hearing this, I said:

‘I have told you my purpose, which is quite serious, and do you consider what you think best for you and me.’

‘That is good,’ he said; ‘at some other time then we will consider and act as seems best about this and about other matters.’

Whereupon, I fancied that he was smitten, and that the words which I had uttered like arrows had wounded him, and so without waiting to hear more I got up, and throwing my coat about him crept under his threadbare cloak, as the time of year was winter, and there I lay during the whole night having this wonderful monster in my arms. This again, Socrates, will not be denied by you. And yet, notwithstanding all, he was so superior to my solicitations, so contemptuous and derisive and disdainful of my beauty—which really, as I fancied, had some attractions—hear, O judges; for judges you shall be of the haughty virtue of Socrates—nothing more happened, but in the morning when I awoke (let all the gods and goddesses be my witnesses) I arose as from the couch of a father or an elder brother.

What do you suppose must have been my feelings, after this rejection, at the thought of my own dishonour? And yet I could not help wondering at his natural temperance and self–restraint and manliness. I never imagined that I could have met with a man such as he is in wisdom and endurance. And therefore I could not be angry with him or renounce his company, any more than I could hope to win him. For I well knew that if Ajax could not be wounded by steel, much less he by money; and my only chance of captivating him by my personal attractions had failed. So I was at my wit’s end; no one was ever more hopelessly enslaved by another.

(Symposion 218c-219e Overs: Jowett)

På dansk

Kære Alkibiades! Du er vist ikke så tosset endda, hvis det virkelig er sandt, hvad du siger om mig, og der er en eller anden kraft i mig, som kan gøre dig bedre. Du må se en ufattelig skønhed i mig, fuldstændig forskellig fra dit eget smukke udseende. Hvis du har fået kig på den og prøver at slå en handel af og bytte skønhed for skønhed, så regner du med at få en del mere ud af det end jeg. Til gengæld for en tilsyneladende skønhed prøver du at skaffe dig den sande skønhed, ja du har faktisk i sinde ‘for en gylden’ at bytte dig til ‘en rustning af bronze’.[1]

Men kære ven, pas hellere på, at jeg ikke narrer dig ved ikke at være noget værd. Tankens klarsyn skærpes først, når øjnene så småt taber deres evne til at se. Og det er du stadig langt fra.[2]

Rasmus Sevelsted skriver følgende om ‘eros’ i forordet til andet bind af den nye Platon-oversættelse:

Eros er ikke et udelukkende positivt begreb; der findes ‘smuk’ og ‘forkastelig’ eros, og det var den almindelige opfattelse, at det er både vulgært og forkasteligt, hvis eros kun består af ren og skær tilfredsstillelse af et fysisk behov. Det er et udtryk for den enkeltes gode eller dårlige karakter, om et erotisk forhold er smuk eller forkasteligt; der er ikke nogen moralsk skelnen imellem eros mellem de to køn og eros mellem to af samme køn.[3]

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[1] jvf Iliaden VI.235
[2] Platon: Samlede værker i ny oversættelse, bind II. København 2010. s. 378
[3] Platon; Samlede værker i ny oversættelse, bind II. København 2010. s. 307

Alderdom

“I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is—I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too being old, and every other old man, would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles,—are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men’s characters and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.”

Platon: Staten 329a (Jowett)

Den Europæiske Filosofis Historie!

Bedst som jeg sad på terrassen og læste i Karsten Friis-Johansens bind om antikken (venter stadig på at Jørgen Hass skal få afsluttet bind 4 og det har vi gjort i mere end tyve år) engang i sommer, dukkede dette fascinerende væsen op og landede ganske upåvirket midt i Platon.